








This study uses data from a random survey of 2001 Michigan households to
analyze the extent to which the Michigan ctreuit-breaker has been successful in
reducing the income regressivity of the property tax and in changing relative
property tax burdens. Because of its relatively extensive coverage, including
renters as well as homeowners and the nonaged as well as the aged, the
circuit-breaker has yielded a more equal distribution of income within
Michigan. Its potential to change the distribution of income depends on the
particular formula utilized, but redistributional effects have thus far been
lamited because program participation has been positively correlated with
income. To the extent that reductions in the price ofpublic services created by
the circuit-breaker are perceived by households, the biggest stimulus appears to
be in high property tax/high-income counties
During the past two decades 29 states have responded tovoter dissatisfaction with rising property taxes by institut-
ing circuit-breakers to provide property tax relief (ACIR, 1979).
In so doing, they have changed both the incidence of the property
tax and tax price of local governmental services. In this article we
utilize survey data to investigate the distributional consequences
of statewide property tax relief with reference to the Michigan
circuit-breaker.
Earlier work on the circuit-breaker focused on whether current
or permanent income was the proper measure by which to
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evaluate redistributive effects (Aaron, 1974), as well as the design
aspects of the circuit-breaker: Should benefits be awarded after a
tax threshold is reached or on a sliding scale? (ACIR, 19°l5; Gold.
1976). However, data limitations restricted substantially the
empirical detail of the analyses. This study fills in some of the
informational gaps resulting from these data limitations, while
asking whether the Michigan circuit-breaker has been successful
in reducing the income regressivity of the property tax and in
changing relative property tax burdens.
The second section of this article provides the background for
understanding property tax circuit-breakers. The survey data set
is used to describe the benefit distribution of the Michigan circuit-
breaker program within income, age, and homeownership cate-
gories. These results are presented for taxpayers who have taken
advantage of the program and those who could have taken
advantage of it. This comparison offers some indication of the
percentage of households by category who participate in the tax
relief program.
The third section presents two measures: one for evaluating the
income distributional effect of the circuit-breaker and the other
for describing the distribution of property tax credits. These
measures are used to summarize the results of a series of
simulations that evaluate changes in each of three key parameters
in the Michigan circuit-breaker formula. We show how to find a
circuit-breaker schedule that meets the objective of proportionality
in the property tax system, and we test its success in reaching that
goal.
The final section of this article examines the differential effect
the circuit-breaker has on the tax prices for local public services
facing Michigan voters The analysis indicates that the pattern of
tax price changes very well run counter to the local spending
behavior that the state might want to encourage. On balance we
find that the Ctrcuit-breake-r. as currently administered, is rot
successful. It achieve neither an equit) goal by substantialli,
altering the distribution of income nor a political goal by leading
to widespread household perceptions of lower propertv tax
payments. The analysis does make clear, however, that some
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changes in the circuit-breaker formula, and in the way it is
administered, can move the program much closer to the previously
stated economic and political objectives.
THE MICHIGAN CIRCUIT-BREAKER
THE DATA SET
Our analysis of the Michigan property tax circuit-breaker uses
survey data collected in November and December 1978. The
survey questionnaire was administered by the University of
Michigan Institute for Social Research using telephone interviews
of approximately 20 minutes in length. The survey itself involved
a random sample of 2001 Michigan households.
The survey was conducted shortly after the November 1978
election, an election characterized by the presence of three tax
limitation proposals on the ballot. Their presence, and the
consequential discussion focusing on state and local governmental
tax and expenditure behavior, brought tax service-level
issues directly to the voters’ attention. Respondents were question-
ed about family income, house value, property tax payments,
homeownership status, and whether they had filed for the circuit-
breaker on their last income tax return.1 The responses were of
derail to allow us to calculate estimated individual
circuit-breaker refunds by simulating respondent participation in
the actual ongoing state program or in variants of that program.2
The data set also allowed us to study individuals not
receiving benefits ’here eligible for the program.
THE PROGRAM
The Michigan circuit-breaker pi oxides an income tax credit to
all property taxpaj<i> v~l~o qualii) .-ep-ardles,% of then age,
income, or homeownership status Program be~~ef9t~ are deter-
mined using athreshold formula (see ACIR. l~‘7~~, ~hich defines
an acceptable property tax burden as being 3.5% of household
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income. Specifically, for most fliers, the circuit-breaker credits :s
calculated using the following formula:
R = .6’&dquo; (T - .035*)) If T > 035*Y
=0 If T ~ .-035*Y
R g $1200
where R = state personal income tax credit
T = local property tax liabilities
Y = income (from all sources)
Senior citizens, the handicapped and blind, some veterans, and
farm owners face more generous formulas, although the largest
rebate any filer can receive is restricted to $1200.
Renters use the same formula as homeowners. The state
assumes that 17% of the rent paid goes to property taxes, so that
renters substitute .1 ~*~FW nt) for T when calculating their credit.3 3
Both renters and homeowners receive, as a credit, 60% of the tax
payment in excess of the threshold. Senior citizens are treated
more generously. Property taxes paid in excess of the 3.5%
threshold are rebated in full. Senior citizens with incomes below
$6000 face an even more generous formula since the tax burden
threshold is set at a percentage of family income that ranges from
0 to 3.0% depending on income.
Taxpayers must file a separate form with their Michigan State
Income Tax returns in order to receive the circuit-breaker refund.
While this undoubtedly eases the task of running
the circuit-breaker program, it in two corn-
sequences that have important policy implications. First, those
who do not file state income tax r eturns will not receive property
tax credits, and second, tying the property tax rebate to the state
income tax return obfuscates one economic impact of this type of
tax relief-the reduction of local tax burdens. Taxpayers are
likely to view the circuit-breaker as an income tax refund rather
than as a reduction in local property taxes.
Despite the need to file the income tax form, over 1,150,000
Michigan taxpayers received a total of over $280,000,000 in
program benefits in 1977.4
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DATA COMPARABILI’:Y
We can get a rough sense of the reliability of our data set by
comparing sclcctcd sarnplc summary measures with data obtained
by the Michigan State Treasury Department (based on a 10%
sample of 1977 returns). We should note, first, that the state data
are taken from individual returns and thus exclude information
about nonfilers. Thus the state data provide no information
about those who are eligible but who failed to file for a tax credit.
Our analysis is based on 1772 observations of individuals who
provided sufficient information for us to obtain an estimate of
their property tax credit.
In 1977 the State of Michigan estimated the average credit paid
to those successfully filing for credits as $249. Our data suggest
that if all eligible individuals did file, their average payments
would be $237, 5% less. In fact, we calculate that 53% of the
sample should receive a credit, only 33.8%
actually receive credits according to the state. The evidence of
limited participation in the program, in the 60% range, is quite
clear. Because the state looks only at those claiming and
we look at those eligible, further direct comparisons are not
fruitful. Our attempt to make a more direct by asking
respondents dircctly whcthcr they filed for a property tax credit
was not fully successful because some of those stating that they
did file were not eligible by our calculations.5 For this reason, we
continue our analysis focusing primarily on all eligible partici-
pants. We do, use the direct response about participation
in the following to obtain some sense of the correlation
between participation and age, income, and homeownership.
PROGRAM BENEFITS
In this subsection we discuss how the circuit-breaker credits are
distributed, focusing on income, age, and homeownership status.
We contrast this with the characteristics of the sample as a whole
and with the potential distributional impacts of a program in which
all eligible residents participate.
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TABLE 1
Estimated Distributional impact of the Circuit-Breaker
Although the state sample illuminates the distribution of
program benefits for those actually receiving circuit-breaker
rebates, it tells us nothing about how this distribution would
compare with the distribution resulting were all eligible households
to take advantage of the program. Table 1 she
distribution of program participants in three categories: for our
entire sample, for those within our sample who stated that they
filed for the circuit-breaker, and for those who we estimate would
receive property tax rebates whether they filed or not.
Although the results differ by whether they focus on income age,
or ownership status, they concur on two important points. First,
the distribution of individuals by each characteristic in the sample
differs substantially from the distribution of those taking advan-
tage of the program. Second, the distribution of those taking
advantage of the program differs from those who could take
advantage.
While the program design may have never incorporated
neutrality as an objective, the actual implementation does have
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distributional consequences. For instance, panel i of Table 1
reveals that 18.7% of the sample have family income
below $8000, only 1 fizz of those ~~: ho report filing for the circuit-
breakei were in this incomc class. Of course, such an outcome
might be consistent with a very low income elasticity of demand
for housing. However, most income elasticity estimates are not
especially low, and our estimates of those who qualified for the
program lead to a different conclusion (see Polinsky and
Ellwood, 1979). By our calculations, over 30% of those who could
take advantage of the program are in the lowest income class. In
contrast, the percentage of high-income respondents stating that
they filed for the circuit-breaker exceeds the proportion that
qualified to receive rebates (and also cxcccds the proportion of
upper-income individuals in the sample as a whole). The data
clearly suggest a high participation rate among high-income
households. The result is that, because of limited participation, a
program that would have had some redistributional effect may
operate in the opposite direction.6
A similar story can be toid for homeowners and renters.
Despite provision for renters in the circuit-breaker formula,
renters participate in the program to a much smaller extent than
do homeowners. If, however, we look at its eligible for
circuit-breaker we see that those who under the
present state formula are in line with the actual distribution of
homeowners and renters in our sample.
Table 1 deals only the percentage of beneficiaries and not
with the distribution of benefits. It is conceivable that the benefit
tao filcrs is to the distribution of all eligible
households. Panel i of Table 2 cxamincs this question for
different classes in the The distribution of dollars
between classes also depending on whether we
restrict our examinatior-. to those who claim to have filed for the
credit or whether we look at all those in the sample who we
determine to be eligible. The redistributional consequences
are muted, however, because while eligibility for rebates is
progressive in incidence, larger rcbates go to higher-income
individuals pane ii of Table 2, lino
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TABLE 2
Survey Estimated Distribution of Credits
Overall, we find that within our sample the distribution of
benefits to those who file for the circuit-breaker differs relatively
little by income class from the original roughly equal allocation of
individuals to income classes (see panel i of Table I, row 1). This
occurs despite the low participation rates of the lowest-income
individuals, because average benefits are so much higher than for
other income classes. When all in our sample who are eligible are
included in the program, there is a sizable transfer to the lowest
income class, but the transfer is muted somewhat because larger
average credits for this category go to higher income individuals.
In both cases, the effects upon the midrange income classes are
minor.
It is hard to summarize broadly all of the previous results, but
what is clear is that the current program can and does have
different effects depending on the level of participation in. the
program. In the next section of this article, we assume full
participation-that all who are eligible will take advantage of a
circuit-breaker program as a basis for comparing different





A clear consensus does not exist as to which distributional
objectives should be met by the circuit-breaker. Grubb and
Hoachlandet ( 1978)> for example, argue that the primary goal is
to measure the income distributional effects and the tax benefit
minimizing dislocation costs. Other economists and politicians
have focused more directly on the objective of reducing property
tax burdens whatever the final incidence on income (see Shroeder
and ~jacl~ist, 197§).
In this article we develop two summary measures that allow us
to measure the income distributional impacts and the tax benefit
distribution of a series of simulated circuit-breaker program
reforms. We chose the first measure as an indicator of the
program’s ability to achieve an equity goal of a more progressive
income distribution, and the second as an indicator of the success
of the political goal of reducing tax burdens of high property
taxpayers. In doing so, however, we make no normative judgment
as to the importance of either of the measures. Nor are we in a
position to discuss or analyze the difference between distributional
effects measured in terms of current income as opposed to
permanent income.
To focus on the income regressivity of the property tax, we
calculate the income elasticity of the ratio of property taxes paid
net of circuit-breaker rebates to income. Specifically, the elas-
ticity 0 is defined as follows:
where T represents reported property taxes paid (annually), Y is
family income, and R is our calculated estimate of rebates that
. 
would be paid were all eligible individuals to avail themselves of
the program. By using all eligible applicants we are able to
calculate t~e potenti~ distributic~nal e~ects of a ~~en prn~ran~. 0
is calculated from a multiple regression in which all individual
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respondent are included in the sample. We have chosen to
specify a linear form with the elasticity calculated at the n1ean to
avoid distortions that arise (for low-income individuals) when a
constant elasticity formulation is used. 0 has the property of
being equal to 0 when property taxes paid (net of rebates) are
proportional to income, greater than 0 when the system is
progressive, and less than 0 when the system is regressive.
Under the current Michigan circuit-breaker formula we cal-
culate 0 to be -.l’~6 for homeowners and -.663 for renters,
implying that the current property tax system (with the circuit-
breaker) is regressive.8 When R = 0, we find -.366 for homeowners
and -.999 for renters, so that the current circuit-breaker system
has clearly affected the income regressivity of the property tax. If
the goal is to make the property tax system proportional, we
would need to find a circuit-breaker formula that made 0 approx-
imately equal to zero.
Our second evaluation measure is the income elasticity of the
ratio of tax rebates to total property taxes paid. This elasticity,
denoted f , is defined as follows:
Once again the elasticity is determined from a multiple regression
and evaluated at the point of means. T describes the pattern of
changes in rebates or tax credits by income. Thus it has more to
say about the political consequences of a program change than
about overall income distribution. An elasticity of zero implies
that the ratio of rebates to taxes is independent of income, while a
negative elasticity implies that the ratio of rebates to taxes falls as
income rises. Other things equal, the more negative the value of î,
the greater the percentage reduction in property tax payments
received by those with low rather than high incomes. For the
current Michigan system we calculate to be -.592 for homeowners
and -1.136 for renters.
Now we are in a position to discuss possible reforms of the
circuit-breaker formula. Initially, we maintain the existing struc-
ture, but change selected formula parameters.9 To generalize the
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TABLE 3
Simulated Distributional Impact and Costs of Selected
Changes in the Michigan Formula
a. Initially r = .6, p = .035, L = 1200.
b. Ratio of cost of reform to cost of current program, assuming full participation.
c. Step funetron.
d. Revised step function.
current circuit-breaker formula, let r represent the reimbursement
rate (.6 currently), p equal the threshold percentage (.035 in this
case), and L equal the maximum rebate attainable ($1200 in this
case). Table 3 summarizes the results of a number of simulations
in which each of the parameters r, p, and L were allowed to vary
individually, with the remaining parameters set at their initial
values.
First consider the possibility of changing the threshold percent-
age, p. The overall income distribution effects of any change in p
are quite small for both renters and homeowners (0 changes only
slightly). This reflects, in part, the fact that as the threshold
percentage is decreased, the limit of $1200 comes into effect more
frequently for those in the lower half of the income distribution
and mutes any possibility of substantial redistribution. Despite
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the insensitivity of the summary measures there is some redistribu-
tion among income classes that is important. If we were to divide
all households into five roughly equal income classes, as is done in
the second section of this article, we would find that an increase
in the threshold proportion from .025 to .045 substantially in-
creased the share of tax rebates received by the lowest income
class (from 22.% to 37.4%, with the current share [p = .035] being
29.5~%a). The second lowest income class increased its share
slightly, while all other classes received smaller proportions as the
threshold rate increased. What has happened, of course, is that
the increase in the threshold level reduces program eligibility
. primarily for taxpayers with relatively high incomes. This
reduction substantially outweighs the reduction in eligibility for
individuals with low incomes. However, since the total number of
individuals participating under the program with a high threshold
level is reduced, and because the higher threshold reduces benefit
levels for everyone below the cap, there is very little overall
income distributional impact.
The effect on relative tax reduction is quite important,
however it is measured. The change in the distribution of rebates
by income class is reflected here as a sharp decline in ? as p rises.
This tells us that those with low incomes receive relatively greater
percentage tax reductions than do those with high incomes. In
fact, the relative benefits to the poor can be increased by
increasing p, which saves substantially on program cost. However,
absolute benefits fall for all income classes, so an increase in p can
only be motivated by a desire to save costs without substantial
adverse distributional effects. Put somewhat differently, a decrease
in p is not a very good policy change because (a) it does little to
affect the overall income distributional impact of the circuit-
breaker, (b) it increases the relative benefits received by those with
high incomes, and (c) it is extremely costly. _
Now consider the impact of a change in the reimbursement rate
r. Here the income distributional impact is substantial. An
increase in the reimbursement rate substantially decreases the
regressivity of the property tax for both homeowners and renters.
While full reimbursement does not make the property tax system
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~’cpor~c~nal,~app~thataprogt~that~~b~df~r~b~~ent
with a lower threshold percentage eould come closer to this goal.
The cost of such a program would not be trivia since 42-60/o
added cost is associated with full reimbursement alone. Not
surprisingly, changing r has little effect on T - Since p is fixed, there
is no change in who is eligible for the program and only the
maximum rebate limit of $1200 affects the value of T. In
particular, as the reimbursement rate increases, the limit comes 
&dquo;
into effect for more individuals (especially those with low to
middle incomes) so that the rebate rate elasticity becomes less
pro-poor.
In order to see how a combination of changes might improve
distribution without adding much additional cost, we simulated
the effect of a plan with p = .045 and r-- 1.0. Such a plan would re-
duce the costs of the present circuit-breaker formula by 2.5% and
in so doing would provide substantial redistributive benefits.
While this precise formulation does not meet the objective of
making the property tax proportional it does move in that direc-
tion. 6 for both homeowners and renters is less regressive than in
any other simulation expectihe relatively expensive plan of p ~ .035,
and r = 1 ~o-. ~ut~st~ates nf ~ iaditate that the distribution of
rebates is also, relatively pro‘puo~.
Finally, consider the effect of a change in the rebate limit,
currently at $1200. The effects are really quite small across the
board, with the only substantial measured change being an
increase in the income regressivity of the property tax (net of
rebates) when the limit is reduced to $600. While the cost savings
of such a reduction are not large (in the order of 10%), our
analysis suggests that by enforcing a lower limit some money
could be saved that could &dquo;better&dquo; be spent on an increased
reimbursement rate. To test this, we simulated the effect of a
reform with a reimbursement rate of .8 and a limit of $600. We
found that this program change had very little to offer in the way
of redistributional benefits. In fact, homeowners with low
incomes were found to be slightly worse off than with the original
program, and in general the elasticity of tax rebates indicates a
more regressive structure.
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If either of the two distributional objectives is to be achieved at
minimum cost, it is clear that more substantial changes in the
circuit-breaker formula must be incorporated. 10 The obvious way
to do so is to make each of the three policy parameters a function
of income. We use a simple step function to achieve this objective
and to minimize administrative problems. To illustrate such a
change we have simulated the effects of a reform in which we
allow the reimbursement rate to vary inversely with income as
follows:
Under such a reform the property tax net of rebates becomes
nearly proportional for homeowners and substantially less regres-
sive for renters. At the same time there is relatively little change in
the rebate rate elasticities. Note that this particular simulated
reform actually costs 4% less than the current Michigan system.
The example ma~es it clear that allowing the policy parameters
to vary with income can have a sizable impact on distribution.
Thus while simplification of structure may be politically desirable,
it is not the most effective way of altering the income distribution.
Focusing on the continuous analogoue of the previous step
function we can utilize the data to find a formula that guarantees
that proportionality will be achieved.&dquo; In this more general
formulation we let r and p be functions of income, Y, but assume
that either no rebate limit exists or that it is sufficiently large to
have little effect on any redistribution attainable. In this case the
rebate formula becomes
R = r(Y)[T - p(Y)Y] [3]
where R is the dollar amount of the rebate. A proportional tax net
of rebate is one in which d[(T - R) j Y] dY equals 0. Notice that
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the derivative is proportional to 0 , the income elasticity of the
ratio of net property taxes to income. The first-order condition
that is sufficient to achieve proportionality is as follows:
In general there are an infinite combination of r(Y) and p(Y) that
will solve the equation, so we simplify by asking whether there
exists an r(Y) that works when p is constant, and then whether
there is a p(Y) that works when r is constant.
First consider the case in which p is constant. The solution to
the differential equation implicit in equation 4 is as follows:
where K is a constant of integration and Q(Y) = d[(T/ Y)/ dY~. The
constant of integration is arbitrary and can be chosen to minimize
the cost of the program. p, of course, is given and fixed, and Q(Y)
can be determined by running a regression of T/ Y as a function of
Y (either linear or a polynomial is likely to do). For example, we
estimated the following quadratic function (t statistics in paren-
theses).
We then evaluated Q(Y) for the midpoints of each of the five
income classes, and chose that value of K that resulted in a
reimbursement rate of 0 for the highest income class. This reduces
costs at the expense of being unable to achieve full redistribution
within the highest class. In fact, we found that with p chosen to be
.035, and a limit of $1200, there is no solution for r(Y) that can
achieve full proportionality without allowing the reimbursement
rate to be negative for those with high incomes or greater than
100% for those with low incomes. Without the limit L, a lower
146
ofpis Iskely to be more successful Eveathaugh we could not
achieve full proportionality with p equals to .035~ we reestin-tated
the circuit-bre-3kcr using a r-ebate, schedule derived inthe manner
described above. We can see from Table 3 that equity is improved
considerably over the -present program with only ~~~ greater
costs. However, our fine tuning does not yield a result much
different than does the use of a simple step function, which is even
expensive.
We then held r constant and solved for p, withthe following
solution:
Using the same formula for Q(Y) as before and choosing a value
for K to limit the cost of the program, we simulated this reform,
keeping the $1200 limit in place. Because of the large effect on
program cost of setting the threshold too low we were forced to
vanstrain our m:hedum~5;o that not -everyone i’rom each income
-vlau would be eligible. We found that vvhile equity was improved,
changes in p did not have major impacts on our distributional
measures. 12 Again we found that there is a highly complex
interaction between the three parameters and that without
simulating the various program reforms, it is not possible ttell
precisely what the distributional and cost effects will be.
OTHER EFFECTS OF THE CIRCUIT-BREAKER
In addition to its distributional effects the circuit-breaker may
influence household behavior. For one, a more generous formula
can reduce the after-tax price of housing, thus encouraging
greater housing consumption. Second, circuit-breakers may
encourage the use of property taxes rather than user charges,
when the latter may be more efficient in the sense of more closely
approximating a benefits tax. (Of course, the federal income tax
deductibility of property taxes may do this as well.) In addition,
circuit-breakers may reduce the work incentives of low-income
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households, although in Michigan the credit for city income taxes
paid goes in the o-ther- direction. A fourth effect is that circuit-
breakers may after the level of support of individuals in the
population for property tax increases and thus increase the level
of public services provided. 
+
Whether increased expenditures are desirable or not depends,
of course, on whether one believes that current service levels are
proper. If one were to argue that the level of services provided by
the median voter13 understates the socially desirable level of
services because of the presence of positive beneficial externalities
(e.g., in education) a program that lowers tax prices (measured as
the cost to a household of financing an additional $1 per capita of4 
°
local expenditures) and stimulates public spending may improve
social welfare.
To get a rough sense of the order of magnitude of the effect of
the circuit-breaker, we assumed that the circuit-breaker reduces
tax price but has no measurable effect on household income and
no impact on the decision to migrate to a new jurisdiction. We
then calculated the mean tax prices for individuals in Michigan by
county of residence under the assumption that no circuit breaker
benefits were perceived. We also recalculated these statistics
under the assumption that all individuals perceived the benefits of
the current system, as well as a number of reforms suggested
earlier. The results are summarized in Table ~.1’~ We might note
first that the circuit-breaker brings about an overall reduction in
tax price of 30%, a substantial change. If the price elasticity of
demand for public services were equal to -1, for example, the
circuit-breaker could lead to an approximately 30% increase in
the level of public spending. Even for a much smaller elasticity the
effect can be substantial, 15
It is important to realize, however, that individual voters may
not perceive the price reduction as such. There is some preliminary
evidence that supports this view; Rubinfeld (1977) found that
voters in a local school election in Troy, Michigan, did not
respond to the circuit-breaker, and similar results were found by
Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1982). Of course, voter perceptions may
change over time as information improves, so that our 30%
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TABLE 4
The Effects of the Circuit-Breaker on Tax Price
a. Counttcs~tsted inciude only these with 20 or more observation$-
b. We define tax price in text. A more accurate definition would incorporate the
individual’s federal marginal tax 1~>=ec4ret, the reHance of the locality on property
taxes, the rr~atchmg rate of intergovernmental grants, the &dquo;ftypaper qffect,&dquo; and the
extent to which indtistrial and commercial property share the tax burden.
c. Tax Price with Credit is calculated on the assumptions that only those who claimed
to have filed for a credit actually perceive a price reduction, The price reduction
would be greater were we to measure the potential impact of the program.
d. The row stating overall results is calculated as the mean of ati individuals obset-
vations for the entire survey.
provides an upward bound for future circux~rcaker-mdueed
public spending increases. n
It is also clear from Table 4 that the magnitude of the price
reduction varies from county to county (from a lower-bound
ratio of .61 to a high of .92). The overall pattern is not all that
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TABLE 5
Correlations Between Macro (Micro) Policy Variable
NOTE: For 38 counties with N > 10 (for 1129 individuals). -
See Appendix for definitions.
consistent, but one thing that is clear is that the smallest
percentage price reductions occur in counties with below-average
income and property tax base per capita. On the other hand,
Oakland, the highest income county, with a substantial property
tax base-and substantial public spending, faces an above-average
reduction in tax price. Thus the incentive to spend more is, if
anything, likely to be positively related to the income of the
ct~mmunity-an unsettling result if one’s objective is to stimulate
spending in low-income, low-spending areas.
All of the conclusions that one might reach from Table 4 must
be taken as tentative, if only because the data represent county
means rather than observations about individuals within the
county. This is a particular problem when one is discussing the
effect of the circuit-breaker on tax price, an effect that is felt very
unevenly by households within a jurisdiction. This can be seen by
examining Table 5, which includes some of the simple correla-
tions between a number of relevant policy variables, calculated
first using the county means for all counties with a sample of ten
or more households and second for all homeowners within the
circuit-breaker sample.
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Note first that tax base per capita is positively correlated with
income at the micro level and negatively-coire,4ated with income
when county data are used. This may be due in part because lower
tax base, high-income counties tend to have a much higher tax
rate than do their low-income counterparts. 16 This corresponds to
a similar result cited by Inman and Rubinfeld (1979) and supports
our negative conclusions about the circuit-breaker for a number
of reasons. First, the cost of achieving redistribution is not small
in terms of budgetary outlays made by the state. Second, the
income distributional consequences of the program as designed
may never be achieved in practice because of the failure of eligible
participants to claim their credits. Finally, while the circuit-
breaker will tend to reduce tax prices, (a) voters do not perceive
those reductions, and (b) the reductions are greatest in those
communities with relatively high income and local spending.
Thus if one takes as an ancillary goal the increased spending of
low-income, low-spending jurisdictions, the circuit-breaker may






1. There were 338 households that did not answer the question concerning household
income. We were able to assign predicted income values for all but 53 of these households
by using a multiple regression model to arrive at predicted income values. The model was
estimated from the rest of the sample and used the following predictors of income : race,
age, education, occupation, sex of head, and hours employed by head and wife. No
assignment was givento those who failed to answer any of the questions used to create the
predictor variables. For more on the survey design and its purpose, see Courant et al.
(1979).
2. We were not able to calculate rebates for 228 of the 2001 households because of
nonresponse on such key variables as house value, income, or homeownership status.
3. As far as we can tell the 17% attempts to account for the shifting of the tax on
renters and is based on Netzer (1966, p. 28).
4. Over 3.4 million Mi-1040 state income tax returns were filed in 1977. Property tax
collection totaled $2 billion in 1976. Circuit-breaker data taken from published state
figures based on a 10% sample of state income tax returns.
5. Some 43% of our sample reported filing for the circuit-breaker (the state sample
reported 33.8% filing). The 43% clearly contains some respondents who were not eligible
to receive a credit (by our calculations), and thus leads to a higher estimate of participation
and a lower estimate of average benefit ($161 per capita). High response participation
rates are consistent with voter survey findings (see Traugott and Katosh, 1979). Because of
this and other technical problems involving data comparability over time, we use the
response to the filing question only to get a sense of how participation rates vary among
households.
6. The general problem of program participation and eligibility and its distributional
consequences is identified by Bendick (1974).
7. The Michigan State analysis also shows larger rebates to high-income filers. Gold
(1979) reports that the percentage of households qualifying for the circuit-breaker falls as
income rises. Of course, reporting progressivity may be muted if we take a life-cycle view of
housing consumption. Those with current high incomes may have lower average incomes,
and vice versa.
8. The term "regressive" here is used only to measure the direct relationship between
taxes and current income. We wish to make no further presumption about the true
"incidence" of the property tax. Whatever that incidence may be, our empirical results
suggest the relationship between changes in the circuit-breaker and changes in that
incidence. For further discussion of the measurement of the incidence of the property tax
with a focus on the distinction between current and permanent income, see Ihlanfeldt
(1979), Aaron (1975), and Netzer (1973). The different elasticity values for homeowners
and renters reflect, in part, different mean income levels for two groups. However, since
the conditions for progressivity or regressivity do not change, our conclusions within
homeownership/renter class are not affected.
9. We assume that the formula for those over 65 does not change.
10. Our presumption is that such reforms were not put into effect for political reasons.
11. We reiterate that proportionality is chosen for the purpose of this example, but
that it does not necessarily have any particular normative significance. Note also that our
regressions are ad hoc, not taking into account general equilibrium effects on consumption
and public services.
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12. Our derived schedules for p and r do little for renters. This is because the schedule
is based upon the relationship we estimated for homeowners
Our attempts at deriving this simple relationship for renters never explained more than
2.6% of the variance.
13. We assume a model in which the circuit-breaker can change the tax price of the
decisive voter (see Inman, 1978).
14. Tax prices appear large in this table because they are based on households. Our tax
price measures the cost of raising an additional dollar of per capita expenditure and
therefore must be multipled by household size. The median size of a Michigan household
is nearly 3.4, causing tax prices to exceed, on average, 1. Sample characteristics can
account for additional tax price variance.
15. We have reason to believe that the price elasticity of demand for public services is
substantially below unity. For a summary of the evidence, see Inman and Rubinfeld
(1979); for some recent evidence, see Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1982). Note also that the
impact of the price change on the median voter has been presumed to equal the mean price
change felt by all households. Failure of this assumption to hold may bias the results, but
we cannot tell in what direction that bias might be.
16. These communities may also have a greater taste for public services.
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